This article highlights transnational consequences for access to justice of political posturing by national governments in respect of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It charts the UK context preceding the adoption of Protocol 15, which inserts the concepts of subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation into the ECHR preamble. The article argues that whilst this was an attempt to curb European Court of Human Rights' powers, this proved limited in effect, as the court is too well established as a Supreme Court for Europe in the cosmopolitan legal order of the ECHR. The political-legal interplay which is the genesis of the ECHR system means that political manoeuvring from national governments is inevitable, but not fatal to its existence. However, the legitimacy of the ECtHR is secured only through political concessions, which act to expel surplus subjects from ECHR protection. The article concludes that the legitimacy of the ECtHR is therefore secured at the cost of individuals whose rights are worth less than the future of the court.
Introduction
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which is supposed to be a check on their own exercise of cases simply by deferring to a thorough national investigation of the human rights issues at play.
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Political and ideological motivations aside, the further revisions that Protocol 15 makes to the ECHR are examined highlighting concerns for access to justice. The restatement of subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation in the preamble to the ECHR is considered to pose no real threat to the status of the ECtHR as a Supreme Court for Europe as such legal-political conflict is inherent in the machinations of the ECHR system. Despite obvious limits to the description of the ECHR as a CLO, the political-legal interplay that lies at the heart of the ECHR system means that such political manoeuvring from national governments form part of the genesis of the ECHR system and is thus inevitable, but not fatal to the ECHR system.
Of more concern is the fact that the legitimacy of the ECtHR is secured only through political concessions, the result of which is to expel surplus subjects from the protection of the rights of the ECHR through limiting access to justice. The article concludes that the legitimacy of the ECHR is therefore secured at the cost of individuals whose rights are worth less than the future of the court, which is too big to fail. This is a moment of exclusion which is written into the text and interpretive methods of the ECHR. Such individuals become the surplus subjects of the ECHR system who are sacrificed in order to secure the ongoing legitimacy of that system.
The UK Context
In January 2012 Prime Minister David Cameron delivered a speech before the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE outlining the concerns held by the UK government about the ECHR system and in particular, the activity of the ECtHR. The UK government's analysis of the 'vital role' played by the ECHR system in the protection of human rights, concluded that this vital role was endangered. In order to save the ECHR system and enable the ECtHR to function to its full potential, the UK government proposed reform highlighting three specific areas of concern.
Firstly, the ECtHR's backlog of cases was too high and was hindering the ECtHR's ability to resolve the most serious human rights cases. This was said to be caused by simply too many cases getting to Strasbourg.
Secondly, the UK government expressed concern about the role of the ECtHR becoming that of a court of fourth instance where all national decisions on ECHR rights could be appealed.
The Prime Minister explicitly linked this "risk" to the right to individual petition, enshrined in Art 34 ECHR. The government stated that this situation should be avoided so that the ECtHR could 'protect itself from spurious cases' which had already been dealt with at the national level. Such an approach assumes that national implementation of the ECHR is beyond reproach and undermines the supra-national 8 status of the ECHR system to which all signatory states agreed.
Madsen explicitly describes the ECtHR as a 'Supreme European Court' 9 charting the evolution from its inception to the institutionally autonomous system that functions today. Indeed the 'normative pull' 10 of ECtHR judgments has been extensive and has exerted a considerable transnational influence on domestic human rights protection in a way that has robustly improved standards of human rights protection. The ECHR system represents 'par excellence' the judicialisation of human rights at the European level. 11 As such, the UK government's fear of the ECtHR becoming a court of fourth instance for Europe has already been realised in practice by virtue of the agreement between CoE states culminating in the signing of the ECHR in 1950 and the subsequent state endorsed evolution of the ECtHR as arbiter for human rights issues in Europe.
The "fear" that the ECtHR would become a court of fourth instance thus reflects the current UK government's national policy concerns which seek to reconstruct the debate around the ECHR as an invasion of national sovereignty by European powers. The UK government would seem to be fixated on maintaining a Diceyan notion of sovereignty 12 when it is clear that such a model has been exposed as problematic to say the least, 13 a situation which is magnified with the advent of the EU and the ECHR which represent 'nodes' of sovereignty, whereby sovereignty is pooled and shared as opposed to one hierarchy of power.
14 Supreme status has been achieved as the result of complex processes and political-diplomatic exchanges between Strasbourg, national governments, NGO activists with the consent of CoE states whose support the ECHR system relies upon for its very legitimacy. The evolution of the ECHR system has been an ongoing exercise in political diplomacy which has translated into the judicial machinations of the ECtHR through the introduction of the margin of appreciation into the interpretive ethic of the Court. in recognition of the fact that there is 'no uniform concept of morals in Europe', 17 although it had been developed by the European Commission of Human Rights some 20 years previously. 18 In absence of European consensus, the ECtHR defers to the decision of national governments via the margin of appreciation. 19 The margin of appreciation is the room for manoeuvre 20 or latitude 21 that the ECtHR affords to states when fulfilling their obligations under the ECHR. The ECtHR has stated that the scope of the margin will vary according to context 22 and some have thus warned that the doctrine must be handled with care. 23 The margin of appreciation can be considered as the tool developed by the ECtHR to negotiate the delicate political balancing of power between signatory states and the ECtHR. Thus the interplay of politics and law surfaces in the interpretive methods of the ECtHR. Some have, however, described the margin of appreciation as embodying the embarrassing doctrine of cultural relativism. 24 Often the invoking of the margin of appreciation sees the ECtHR deferring to the political interests of national governments and thus avoids politically 'damaging confrontations' 25 between the ECtHR and signatory states that would undermine the legitimacy of the ECtHR as an institution.
In accordance with such an analysis and perhaps most tellingly, the third point causing consternation and concern for the UK government was the so-called shrinking of the margin of appreciation: 'At times, it has felt to us in national governments that the 'margin of appreciation' -which allows for different interpretations of the Convention -has shrunk'.
26
That the margin of appreciation allows for 'different interpretations' of the ECHR is a point to be contended, as the margin is simply supposed to give national governments room to manoeuvre within the meaning of ECHR rights. However, Cameron's statement belies little and is a realistic assessment of the way the margin has been applied by the ECtHR in controversial cases of political sensitivity which cut to the core of the democratic state and issues of national security. European supervision by the ECtHR in those cases has been completely absent.
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As Benvenisti notes, the result of deferring to the majority-dominated national institutions via the margin of appreciation, is to stultify the goals of the human rights system of the ECHR and 'abandon the duty to protect the democratically challenged minorities'. 28 In such instances the ECtHR is not merely giving national governments latitude but rather deferring to their interests or interpretation of the ECHR altogether. The assertion by the UK government which considers the margin of appreciation to have 'shrunk', is a tautology at best considering that the raison d'etre of the margin of appreciation is the flexibility that it provides in balancing national European human rights protection; thus malleability is inherent in the very form of the margin of appreciation.
The context that gave rise to the UK government's concerns about the margin of appreciation and the ECHR system more generally was the ongoing controversy surrounding the issue of prisoners' voting rights and the deportation of Abu Qatada.
Prisoners' Voting
In Cameron lent his voice to the debate more publicly in an article in The Telegraph stating that prisoners 'damn well shouldn't' be given the vote as he vowed to 'clip the wings' of the ECtHR. 43 In Cameron's remarks one witnesses a linguistic slippage which results in the unhelpful conflation of whether Strasbourg has exceeded its powers and the actual question of whether prisoners should have a right to vote. In such a presentation of the issues to the voting public, the dry legal machinations of the ECHR system with its strong roots in the UK stretching back to Winston Churchill and a conservative government who were amongst the most significant drafters of the ECHR, are obscured in favour of a populist, sensationalist and fetishised account of the ECHR punctuated by a few controversial ECtHR decisions. The lines between law and current national political agendas are blurred, painting the ECtHR in a distorted manner. The ECtHR becomes the object of a distorted discourse, particularly in the media, which functions on the basis of an instrumental rationality having certain political goals as its end. 44 As Sir Nicholas Bratza, former UK judge at the ECtHR has stated:
It is disappointing to hear senior British politicians lending their voices to criticisms more frequently heard in the popular press, often based on a misunderstanding of the court's role and history, and of the legal issues at stake. Universal suffrage is a fundamental principle in democracy. My position is that a blanket, automatic ban does indeed violate basic principles. If deprivation of the right to vote is to be a punishment, then this should be expressly spelled out in each individual case by a judicial authority.
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Thus the problem is a legal one, centred upon the notion of proportionality which requires that the UK government insert into its laws on prisoners' voting an element of flexibility which allows each case to be assessed on the individual merits as opposed to an outright ban for all prisoners. The point is an easily remedied legal one, one which the ECtHR reiterated in the 
Abu Qatada
Another hot topic that has fuelled controversy around the ECtHR and its place in UK law and politics has been the deportation of Abu Qatada. The issue then went to the ECtHR, who found in favour of Qatada's article 6 claim on the basis that there would be a real risk that evidence obtained by torture of third persons would be used against Qatada at retrial.
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Qatada was finally deported the following year on 6 July 2013 after an agreement was signed between the Jordanian authorities and the UK stating that evidence gained through torture would not be used in retrial against Qatada. Despite the deportation of Qatada, the UK Home Secretary, Theresa May, took this opportunity to further lambast the ECHR. Referring to the 'crazy interpretation of our human rights laws' by the ECtHR she cited the Qatada affair as proof that the UK should very carefully consider its relationship with Strasbourg. 'All options'
May stressed, 'including withdrawing from the convention altogether -should remain on the The fact was simply that the desires of the UK government, to deport Qatada regardless of the consequences, were out of line with the democratic principles of the rule of law whereby trial and due processes should not be compromised by the admission of torture evidence. Such a conclusion is supported by the established case law of the ECtHR and the United Nations
Convention Against Torture to which the UK is signatory.
Brighton Reform
Work to reform the ECHR system began at conferences in Interlaken and Izmir and continued at the Brighton Conference which was organised by the UK government in its capacity as chair of the CoM of the CoE. The conference, held in Brighton in April 2012, produced the 'Brighton Declaration' on the future of the ECtHR. 58 The media, already galavanised by prisoners' voting and Abu Qatada, maintained an increasingly hostile approach to human rights discourse and set the scene in Brighton as a head to head between Strasbourg and London where the UK Affirming that the High Contracting Parties, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, have the primary responsibility to secure the rights and freedoms defined in this Convention and the Protocols thereto, and that in doing so they enjoy a margin of appreciation, subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights established by this Convention. 62 The reworded preamble clearly aims to bestow a primary role on national governments thus reinforcing national sovereignty, and a secondary role on the ECtHR. This is not an insignificant move as the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties describes the preamble to a convention as an integral part of the instrument.
However the reaction at this attempt to embed subsidiarity and impose meaning on the established ECHR doctrines demonstrates how well established the ECHR institutions are.
Joint NGO organisations welcomed the reiteration of the supervisory role of the ECtHR stating that the preamble thus 'recognizes that the court remains the sole institution empowered to define, develop and apply tools of judicial interpretation'. 63 Further this new mention of the margin of appreciation is to be 'consistent with the doctrine…as developed by the Court in its case law' 64 and is therefore not intended to change the margin of appreciation in any way. The
ECtHR and the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE have both expressed the understanding that the doctrine of the margin of appreciation should not be altered 65 in light of Protocol 15.
However, it is clear from the wording of the new preamble, especially in light of UK government political preferences, that the intention was to shift power in favour of national governments in terms of deciding when they should be subject to human rights review and to limit the scope of the ECHR in reducing the time limit for applications and amending the admissibility criteria to the ECtHR. 66 The UK government consider that Protocol 15 shifts the role of the ECtHR to that of advisory body and have declared to have brought change to the way in which the ECtHR operates through the Brighton declaration.
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Diverging interpretations of the effect of Protocol 15 thus attest to the dialectic that the ECHR system exists in as between national politics and European human rights law. Those who favour a strong supranational system of European human rights review consider Protocol 15 to be nothing more than a restatement of the position as it already existed whereas the UK government are of the opinion that they have reformed the ECHR system. As the joint NGO statement highlighted, Protocol 15 'must not result in a weakening of human rights protection', 68 a human rights protection that has not been imposed by a remote European judiciary as the current UK government mandate would have public-political discourse believe but rather has evolved with careful consideration for the delicate balance between the ideology of human rights for Europe and the reality of national political agendas.
The ECHR system already makes huge concessions for government preferences. It gives individuals the right to petition as individuals but then counters these claims with justifications couched in the language of the public good, or national security. As such the ECHR system is one that heavily considers the national political interest in every decision it makes. It is well aware that its existence relies on the legitimation of the state members of the CoE. It does not 66 Articles 1, 4 and 5, Protocol 15. 67 May, supra n55 at col 27. 68 Joint NGO Statement, supra n60 at 1.
want to upset the balance and risk losing legitimacy. Thus the reality is that national political interests play a much larger role than the ideology of a human rights system for Europe would want. Such a reality is a necessary evil of the system itself and is demonstrated in considering the historical emergence of the convention.
ECHR As Politics
In its initial 1950 incarnation the ECHR system was a Cold War endeavour with clear geopolitical connotations. Only much later did this arrangement develop into the sophisticated legal system of today. 69 Madsen demonstrates how the genesis of the ECHR system developed through the interaction of legal actors with the realm of politics which resulted in 'blurred boundaries between law and politics'. 70 These blurred boundaries reflected a lack of institutional autonomy on the part of the ECtHR and the European Commission of Human Rights, which was allied with a lack of legal science and knowledge of European human rights.
Such deficiencies in the ECHR system allowed national political interests to influence the development of the ECHR system. This legal political interplay was personified by advocates of the ECHR who were both politically and legally active 71 , strategically 'zigzagging' between the national and international levels of action incorporated in the ECHR system.
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The drafters of the ECHR knew that the success of the ECHR system depended on striking a balance between the new human rights law of Europe with the national political interests of states. The group of legal experts that drafted the ECHR was thus careful to avoid endangering national political interests by presenting the 'legal idealism' of the ECHR as politically acceptable and pragmatic. 73 The drafting of the ECHR was seen as a way of protecting the 69 Madsen, supra n9 at 138. 70 113 This interplay transposes to the present day existence of the ECHR as a dynamic legal system of human rights protection through the way in which the ECtHR and domestic courts interact and apply the ECHR rights.
Limits to the Cosmopolitan Approach: Politics and the Age of Subsidiarity
However, the limits to the ECHR system as a CLO lie in the very political-legal interplay at the heart of the ECHR system, upon which the ECHR relies for its existence. These limits come to the fore most prominently in the most recent period in the ECtHR's history: the age of subsidiarity.
Following what could be considered a fruitful legal period for the ECHR system in a context of economic prosperity, the suggestion here is that the advent of Protocol 15 represents a The spirit in which Protocol 15 was conceived is antithetical to the notion of the ECtHR as supranational, constitutional court for Europe and the ECHR system as a CLO. However, this form of vying between political and legal and national and international interests lies at the heart of the genesis of the ECHR system. As such, the coming into force of Protocol 15 should be considered as a renewed and inevitable political turn in the evolution of the ECHR system, indeed constitutive of that system, as opposed to fatal to the ECtHR's status as Supreme Court for Europe.
The political will and impetus behind Protocol 15 to limit the powers of the ECtHR is a political will which endures in the UK Conservative party which published a plan to withdraw from the ECHR should it win the next general election 117 . Having won the election, they are pursuing this plan as government policy and building a manifesto for the 2020 general election on the platform of withdrawing from the ECHR. reduce fundamental rights protection in the CoE. Given the UK political will and policy objectives behind Protocol 15, these fears are certainly well founded.
However, as the JCHR noted, subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation are not to be read in a new light. The meaning of those principles is not to be changed to reflect the will of the UK government. In this respect the JCHR, taking the wording of the explanatory material to the Brighton Declaration which states that those principles should be read 'as developed in the Court's case-law' has reiterated the meaning of those principles as espoused by the ECtHR.
The inclusion of these principles in the preamble to the ECHR was not intended to dilute state obligations to the fundamental rights of the ECtHR. Quite the contrary, it can have a 'potentially beneficial effect'.
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Subsidiarity has not been a principle explicit in the evolution of the ECHR system in a way comparable to other interpretive ethics such as the principle of evolutive interpretation. It was not mentioned in talks leading up to the adoption of the ECHR. 123 However, as Mowbray has
shown, subsidiarity has been present from the ECtHR's early decision making and has become more pronounced in the 'contemporary period of heightened state emphasis on subsidiarity'.
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He describes how the early part-time ECtHR demonstrated an evolving notion of subsidiarity in the form of the margin of appreciation. The post-1998 full-time court used subsidiarity to reiterate that the primary responsibility for protecting ECHR rights lay with states 125 whilst also using subsidiarity as a way of promoting state support and compliance for the ECHR Mowbray involve controversial cases of freedom of religion and public order which I would suggest would always invite a wide margin of appreciation or reliance on subsidiarity, whatever the language. Referring to data gathered from HUDOC, the ECHR online database, Mowbray demonstrates that statistically, there has been an increase in average yearly references to subsidiarity in the judgments of the Grand Chamber and Chambers in the post-Interlaken period. 130 It may well be that this increase is due to a shift in language to appease political dissatisfaction and such decisions would have been made anyway under the guise of the margin of appreciation as part of the ongoing legal-political interplay at the heart of the ECHR system.
Discussions emerging around subsidiarity and the ECHR mirror those that have taken place regarding the EU and subsidiarity since the introduction of the principle by the Maastricht Treaty (1992), which question subsidiarity as the correct way to divide competences between EU member states and EU institutions. Controversy has surrounded the question of whether subsidiarity is a legal or political principle. De Burca has described subsidiarity as both a legal and political principle although largely politically driven. 131 Similarly, the Working Group tasked with framing the principle of subsidiarity in the context of drafting the Constitutional Treaty for the EU emphasised the 'essentially political nature' 132 of subsidiarity. Such a view has been endorsed by Petersen who considers that subsidiarity is a concept that can be 'moulded to suit virtually any political agenda'. 133 As such subsidiarity in the EU context allows states to apply EU laws depending on their political aims.
Such an analysis of subsidiarity at the EU level accords well with the analysis being presented here of the introduction of subsidiarity into the text of the ECHR which has largely been fuelled by the political agenda of the UK government. In light of such analysis at the EU level some commentators have suggested that proportionality is a more appropriate guiding principle for the EU in place of subsidiarity. Proportionality has traditionally played a key role in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and is enshrined into the text of the qualified rights of the ECHR.
As such, the move to subsidiarity in Protocol 15 can be considered a retrograde step. The Convention system is subsidiary, not to the political will of national authorities, but to the national system for safeguarding human rights 138 As such, the insertion of these two doctrines into the preamble to the ECHR does not allow for unfettered national interpretations of the ECHR, deciding on an ad hoc basis when governments and domestic human rights protection should be subject to ECHR scrutiny. Rather the inclusion of these doctrines means that states are now under a greater obligation to ensure protection of all ECHR rights in the national system, not just ones that cohere with current 135 Petzold, supra n123 at 11. 136 The JCHR interprets the inclusion of these principles in the preamble as a way to strengthen fundamental rights protection in the CoE as an interaction between the political powers of the UK Parliament having a more involved role of ensuring the protection of the rights of the ECHR and the legal powers at Strasbourg and in national domestic courts. This is a new 'age of subsidiarity' as Robert Spano, judge at the ECtHR has recently described the post Interlaken, Brighton and Protocol 15 era. 139 As Spano explains the ECtHR has taken a 'qualitative democracy-enhancing approach' towards assessing domestic decision making in the context of the principle of subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation. 140 In such an age, national governments and courts take on the greater onus of ensuring the democratic legitimacy and effectiveness of the ECHR system. The ECtHR will, however, be taking great care to ensure that national courts and Parliaments carry out a reasoned assessment of Convention compatibility. 141 The political move manifested in Protocol 15 to limit the legal powers of Strasbourg, has then been apprehended as a continuation of political and legal interplays and as a way to engage more substantively on human rights issues in Europe to ensure better ECHR rights protection. As such, the inclusion of subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation into the preamble of the ECHR can be seen as a way of ensuring that human rights protection in Europe has some possibility of holding up over time. In such a light, the ECHR system presents the level of autonomy required of a CLO which allows it to exist as a participant in ongoing negotiations rather than being beholden to the political will of certain dissatisfied states.
Access to Justice and Surplus Subjects
139 Spano, supra n5. 140 Ibid, 487. 141 Joint Committee on Human Rights, supra n119 at 17.
Of greater concern are the changes to admissibility procedures introduced to the ECHR system by Protocol 15 which have implications for access to justice. These changes introduce a reduction of the time limit to apply to the ECtHR from six to four months and the tightening of the 'significant disadvantage' admissibility criterion. The reduction in time limit clearly reduces an individual's opportunity to apply to the ECtHR. This will have an adverse effect on successful access to a remedy and the effect will be greater on those individuals in vulnerable or precarious circumstances. In particular NGOs have highlighted that circumstances such as slow domestic procedure, geographical remoteness, lack of access to communications technology, limited access to qualified lawyers, lawyers who are not adept at dealing with the ECHR system and those with complex cases would all suffer detrimentally from this change.
The NGOs further felt that this change had been adopted without adequate reflection on the consequences.
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The JCHR report highlights how although this amendment to application time limits was proposed by the ECtHR itself, the ECtHR proposed this change under significant political pressure from national governments to reduce the backlog at the ECtHR. Here, the political pressure from governments and the ECHR system's reliance for legitimacy on national governments manifests in a way which threatens rights protection in Europe. The political pressure exerted on the ECtHR threatens to undermine the individual right to petition which lies at the heart of the ECtHR system. Such political pressure also demonstrates the limits of the ECHR as a CLO as the individual at the heart of the CLO is being erased as a result of national political will.
142 Ibid, 19. The 'significant disadvantage' criterion in the admissibility procedure means that where an applicant has not suffered significant disadvantage an application will be considered to be inadmissible. There are two exceptions to this where a claim should be admitted if i) respect for human rights requires an examination of the application on its merits and ii) no case may be rejected on this ground (of significant disadvantage) which has not been duly considered by a domestic tribunal. Protocol 15 removes the second exception from the admissibility criteria, thus leaving less scope for applications to be saved. The justification for this is to avoid the ECtHR dealing with trivial issues. 143 Many submissions to the JCHR expressed concern that this erasure of the second exception would limit access to justice and result in some cases in a denial of justice altogether; a case should be heard by a least one court no matter how trivial the matter.
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It is clear that the amendments to the admissibility criteria pose a real threat to access to justice and access to the ECtHR. The amendments undermine the right to individual petition which places the individual instead of the state at the core of fundamental rights protection in Europe.
These political moves to limit application to the ECtHR threaten to undermine not only the identification of the ECHR system as a CLO but more importantly, the priority of individual rights protection over national political concerns. Here, the complex interplay of law and politics at the heart of the ECHR system is at its most violent, not in deferring to state interpretations of the fundamental rights of the ECHR, but in potentially blocking access to these rights for some applicants altogether.
This does not however mean that the idea of the ECHR system as a CLO and the ECtHR as a Supreme Court for Europe becomes untenable. Rather the point is to acknowledge that the 143 Supra, n64 at para 23. The principle is de minimis non curat praetor (a court is not concerned with trivial matters). 144 Joint Committee on Human Rights, supra n119 at 22. exclusion of certain subjects from the remit of the ECHR protection, which is the political concession made in Protocol 15, in fact strengthens the characterisation of the ECHR as a CLO and the ECtHR as a Supreme Court for Europe in political terms. Such a moment of exclusion of certain individuals is then written into and constitutive of the ECHR system itself. This is the exclusion that secures the ongoing legitimacy of the ECHR system.
Subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation are the headlines of Protocol 15. These political terms embody the legal-political contestation and conflict which lies at the heart of the ECHR system, given its aspirations for a human rights law for Europe and its foundations in national governments. However, the blunt and blanket changes to access to justice which are by comparison hidden in the text of Protocol 15, are more problematic than the changes to the preamble as they exclude certain individuals and groups from the remit of the ECHR altogether.
Indeed as the ECtHR itself has in the past pointed out 'One can scarcely conceive of the rule of law without there being a possibility of having access to the courts.'
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Integral to the functioning of the ECHR system is a backwards and forwards between political, legal and fundamental rights agendas. Inevitably, subsidiarity has a role to play be it implicit in the ECtHR's legal decision making or explicitly in political statements from signatory states.
Subsidiarity has always been present in the case law of the court most notably in high profile cases such as Sahin v Turkey 146 and Lautsi v Italy. 147 Much like those who will now experience access to justice problems post Protocol 15, the applicants in these two cases also became surplus to the ECHR system and ultimately, national political agendas prevailed. The illusion of justice was served through access to the ECtHR but the same moment of exclusion was present in deferring to national agendas in order to secure the ongoing legitimacy of the ECHR 
Conclusion
Former President of the ECtHR, Jean-Paul Costa, has stated that the principle of subsidiarity is already enshrined in the machinations of the ECtHR in the requirement that applicants exhaust domestic remedies before resorting to Strasbourg. As such, any reiteration or codification of the principle in the preamble to the ECHR would be purely for 'symbolic or political reasons'. 149 As the ILPA submission to the JCHR report noted the changes in relation to admissibility criteria 'strengthens the relative position of national executives against all forms of judicial control and supervision of rights'. 150 This observation sums up what the UK government was aiming to instigate with the Protocol 15 amendments, to strengthen the national executive in relation to judicial control of rights. Again, the interplay between politics and law and the domestic and international presents itself.
The extent to which Protocol 15 will strengthen national powers over the ECHR system is questionable and remains to be seen. But this political move to extend the powers of national governments and limit the powers of Strasbourg vis à vis implementation and interpretation of the ECHR should not be seen as fatal to the ECHR system. Indeed, such political and legal interplay lies at the very heart of the genesis of the ECHR system and as such does not pose a threat to the ECHR system. Rather such political manoeuvres as that of the UK seeking to limit the powers of the ECtHR are often contested not only by civil society, NGOs and Law Societies but also by other national governments. As such these demonstrations of political will and authority, although given credence in the sense of amending the wording of the ECHR are interpreted not as a mandate for the court to curb its activity but instead can be appropriated as a way of bolstering the ECHR system by further developing the dialogue and relationship between Strasbourg and national governments.
The main concern is not for the future of the ECHR system. Politically, such contestation lies at the heart of the ECHR system as a CLO. The evolved and independent ECtHR demonstrates the requisite autonomy characteristic of a CLO to resist political manoeuvres which seek to limit its powers. However, it does so through concessions which see certain groups and individuals expelled as the surplus subjects of the ECHR system and excluded from the protection of ECHR rights. This manifests in Protocol 15 as the reduction of time limit for application and the changes to the significant disadvantage criterion. This moment of exclusion is then integral to the very existence of the ECHR system and moreover, is constitutive of it.
This is a moment of exclusion which is written into the text and interpretive methods of the ECHR. In so doing, the national policy agendas of governments are given an unwarranted space in the transnational jurisprudence of the ECtHR.
The real concern should not then be for the ECtHR, as it is already too well established to revert to a mere human rights advisory body and its place as a Supreme Court for Europe is secure, even in the face of self-serving opposition such as that of the UK government. This is nothing new and such opposition has constituted the existence conditions of the ECHR system from its inception in 1950. Rather, the real concern should be for those individuals and groups who
